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This paper is concerned with the development of a general theory for the 
class of multistage linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) decision problems 
characterized by (i) two decision makers (DM) each with a different objective 
functional to optimize, (ii) one-step delay observation sharing information 
pattern which provides each DM with the observation (but not the action) of 
the other DM with a one-step delay, (iii) a noncooperative equilibrium solution 
concept. In particular, it is proven that, under certain conditions, this class of 
optimization problems admit unique equilibrium strategies for each DM, 
which are linear in the information available. Moreover, exact expressions for 
those unique strategies are given in the paper. When specialized to the case of 
a single objective functional, the theory developed generalizes and unifies some 
of the results found in the literature on dynamic LQG team and zero-sum 
game problems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the interesting, though mathematically challenging, areas of decision 
and control theory is derivation and investigation of the properties of equil ibrium 
solutions of multiperson multicriteria stochastic decision problems. These 
problems are characterized by several decision makers (agents) with decentralized 
dynamic information, acting on a system and seeking to optimize different 
objective functionals. What makes this class of optimization problems mathe- 
matically challenging is that the standard techniques of stochastic ontrol theory 
(such as separation principle, dynamic programming) are not in general applic- 
able, and the equil ibrium solutions of such problems are in general of quite a 
different nature than the optimal solutions of single-criteria stochastic ontrol 
problems. 
In this paper, we develop a general theory for the class of multistage l inear- 
quadratic decision problems characterized by two decision makers, one-step 
delay observation sharing pattern, and a noncooperative equilibrium solution 
concept. In particular, we prove that under certain conditions (which are given 
in the paper), this class of problems admits unique equil ibrium strategies, for 
each decision maker, which are linear in the information available. Moreover, 
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expressions for those unique strategies are given in the paper. The one-step 
delay observation sharing pattern, under which uniqueness is established, 
provides each decision maker with the observation (but not the action) of the 
other decision maker with a one-step delay. This assumption concerning the 
information structure of each decision maker is actually necessary to obtain 
uniqueness, since if either or both decision makers also have access to past 
actions (i.e., under the one-step delay sharing pattern in Witsenhausen's (1971) 
terminology), then it can be shown, by resorting to certain onuniqueness results 
obtained in Basar (1974b, c) within the context of nonzero-sum dynamic 
games, that the equilibrium solution is nonunique and can be nonlinear. Further 
details on this nonuniqueness property of the equilibrium solution under the 
enlarged information structure can be found in Basar (1976a, b). 
In Section 2, we formulate the general problem in precise mathematical terms, 
with special emphasis given on delineation of the strategy spaces of each decision 
maker and the strategy-dependent definition of uniqueness. In Section 3, we 
quote a key result from Basar (1974a, 1975) concerning the equilibrium solution 
of the single-stage version of the problem, and also we summarize the solution 
of an auxiliary filtering problem, which are used in the derivation of the solution 
of the general problem. Section 4 is devoted to derivation and proof of uniqueness 
of the equilibrium solution of the main problem. The key results of the paper 
are embedded in this section in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. The proof of Theorem 4.1 
involves an (inevitably) lengthy and rather intricate induction argument, 
details of which are provided in Section 7 (Appendix). In Section 5, we specialize 
the theory developed to the case of a single objective functional, so as to generalize 
and unify some of the results found in the literature on linear-quadratic- 
Gaussian team and zero-sum game problems. Finally in Section 6 we include 
some closing remarks concerning the nature of the solution, pitfalls of the 
induction proof, and the significance of the information structure. 
2. FORMULATION OF THE DECISION PROBLEM 
In order to properly formulate a multistage decision problem with dynamic 
information structure, it is necessary that the following information is supplied 
precisely: 
(i) Number of decision makers (DM). 
(ii) Number of stages in the decision process. 
(iii) Functional description of the dynamical system. 
(iv) Information structure for each DM, i.e., delineation of the precise 
information gained and recalled by each DM at every stage of the decision 
process. 
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(v) Control (decision) spaces for each DM. 
(vi) Permissible strategies (control aws) for each DM, defined as mappings 
from information spaces into control spaces. 
(vii) Objective functionals. 
(viii) An equilibrium solution concept hat is mutually consistent for all D1VI. 
The decision problem that will be addressed to in this paper involves two DM 
and N decision stages, where N is a positive integer. Evolution of the decision 
process is described by a linear stochastic difference quation 
x(n + 1) = F(n) x(n) + G~(n) ua(n) + G2(n ) u~(n) -/v(n); 
(2.1) 
*(0) = x0,  
where x(n) denotes the p-dimensional state vector at stage n, and ui(n) denotes 
the r~-dimensional decision variable of DMi at stage n. F('), GI('), and Gz(-) 
are matrices of appropriate dimensions and are defined for each n e 0 ~ {0, I ..... 
N - -  1}. The sequence {v(n), n e 0} describes a zero-mean Gaussian white noise 
process with a covariance function E[v(n)vr(h)] = ¢(n)8n~ for all n, k e 0. 
The initial state vector x o is also a Gaussian random vector, statistically inde- 
pendent of the sequence {v(-)}, and with mean ~7 0and covariance Q. 
Information Structure 
At stage n, DB/fl (i) observes x(n) linearly in additive Gaussian noise and (ii) 
has perfect access to D1Vf2's observation at stage n -  1. Likewise, at stage n 
DM2 (i) makes an independent linear observation of x(n) in additive Gaussian 
noise and (ii) has access through a perfect channel to what D1Vfl has observed at 
the previous tage. The noisy state observation of DM1 and DM2 will be denoted, 
respectively, by the m 1- and m2-dimensional vectors zl(n ) and z2(n), at stage n, 
where 
zl(n ) = Hl(n ) x(n) q- %(n), (2.2a) 
z2(n ) = H2(n ) x(n) q- w2(n ). (2.2b) 
Here //1(" ) and Ha(" ) are matrices of appropriate dimensions defined for all 
n E O, and the sequences {wl(n), n ~ 0}, {w2(n), n ~ O} are statistically independent 
zero-mean Gaussian white noise processes with covariance functions 
E[wdn ) wiT(k)] = Rdn ) 8,~ , Vn, k c O, i = 1, 2, 
R~(n) > O, gn e O, i = 1, 2. 
Furthermore, these random processes are also statistically independent of 
{v(.)} and x o . 
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Now, let Z~ denote the complete set of observations made by both DN[ up to 
(and including) stage n, i.e., 
Z~ = {zl(0), z2(0),..., zl(n), zz(n)}. (2.3) 
Then, the dynamic information that is known to (and can be utilized by) DMI  
and DM2 at stage n can be expressed in terms of Z~_ 1 , respectively, as follows: 
~"  = {Z,~_~, zl(n)}, (2.4a) 
~7~ = {Z,_~, z2(n)}. (2.4b) 
We will call this kind of information structure for each DM the one step delay 
observation sharing pattern. Note that this is different han the "one-step delay 
sharing pattern" introduced earlier by Witsenhausen (1971), since the former 
does not include any information on the control values. 
Decision Spaces and Strategies 
Letting R r~ denote the m-dimensional real Euclidean space and ~ the Borel 
field generated by its subsets, we assume the decision spaces of DM1 and DM2 
to be (Rn, ~1)  and (R% ~) ,  respectively. Furthermore, the decision law 
7i n of DMi at stage n is a real-vector-valued Borel-measurable function 
on (R ~*", ~*" ) ,  mapping this observation space into (R% ~r~), where 
mi ~ z~ mi + n(ma + m~). As in the static case discussed by Ba,sar (1975), we 
will impose a finite norm restriction on the decision laws at each stage. But since 
the information structure is of dynamic nature, this can only be done recursively 
as follows: 
Stage O. Since the information structure is static here, we will assume 
7j°(~j °) to possess a finite second-order moment under the Gaussian probability 
measure ~,o ,  that is 
O'Oi°:[fR oT "11/2 I] 7i ]l,., A 7i (~) Yi°(~) dP,?(~)] < ~,  i = 1, 2; (2.5a) 
m i 
~7o zx z,(0). (2.5b) 
Here ~,0  denotes the probability measure induced on 5~ ~ by the random vector 
zi(O), and P,o denotes the corresponding distribution function. We now denote 
the space of all equivalence classes of Borel functions that satisfy the finite 
norm restriction (2.5a) by ~o.  ~or, o is a Banach space. 
Stage 1. The information vectors ~h 1 and ~7~ 1 at this stage are dependent 
on the decision laws employed in the previous stage. Since every 71 ° and 72 o in 
~o~o and ~r'~ °, respectively, is a Borel function, ~?i 1 is a well-defined random 
vector on (R m~, ~,ni), but the probability measure induced by ~?i 1 on ~?  will 
be dependent on ?t ° and 72 o and will not necessarily be Gaussian. To indicate 
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this dependence xplicitly, we will denote the probability measure induced by 
~?i 1 by ~, .  We first note that the random vector zi(1) is linear in y 0(~ 0) and 
7~°(% °) and since the random variables that it depends on have finite second-order 
moments, the probability measure ~1 has finite second-order moments for 
every 71 ° e ~,o~,, 7~ o e ~a~'~ °. Now, we assume ),il(~il) to possess a finite second- 
order moment under the probability measure ~,~,,  that is, 
[ j~ 17 o ~ 1/2 
!l r~ ~ li~ ~ ~= ~ r~ (~:) r?(~:) ~P~A~:)] < o% 
m i
i = 1, 2. (2.6) 
It should be noted that the norm introduced above is inevitably dependent on 
the decisions made at the previous stage. Hence, for each pair (71 °, y2 °) we 
denote the space of all equivalence classes of Borel functions yi 1 that satisfy 
(2.6) by £a~(70). It should be clear that for every fixed y o e ~<~r,~ ° and y0 e ~,a,~o, 
oga~i~,.~, t r0xjis a Banach space. 
Permissible strategy spaces of the decision makers at subsequent stages can 
likewise be defined. An appropriate definition for stage n (n e 0) would be as 
follows: 
Stage n. The information vectors ~71 '~ and ~2 ~ are dependent on the decision 
laws employed in the previous tages. Furthermore, ~?i n is a well-defined random 
vector on (R m~, ~)  and possesses finite second-order moments. Let us denote 
n-1 7n_ l ,  the sequence of Borel functions {yl °, 7~ °, 711, 721,..., 71 ,7~-1} by and the 
n yn --i 
probability measure induced by ~7i n on ~ by ~,# . Then the decision laws 
yl ~ and 7fl * to be picked at this stage are assumed to satisfy the finite norm 
restriction 
fR T n-i 11/2 
min 
i = 1, 2. (2.7) 
We denote the space of equivalence classes of all such Borel functions ),i n by 
S'i~A,n-l~ for each permissible sequence of strategies" 7n-1. S~ r.2(7~-1) is" a 
~0 • i . 
Banach space for every fixed{yi°~ r** , Y2 °E _w%o ~, i = c/g, lV^,i-lx ^ , i = 50%~(,~/-1"t 
i = l, 2,..., n}. 
Objective Functionals 
The quadratic objective (cost) functionals of DM1 and DM2 are denoted by 
J1 ° and j0 ,  respectively, and are defined by the following expressions: 
1 N--1 
1 xr(N ) CI(N ) x(N) q- ~ C~(n) km(~_q m, _u2m ) = ~ [xr(n) x(n) 
@ uir(n) Dll(n) ul(n) ~- uzT(n) D,2(n) u2(n)]; (2.8a) 
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1 N- -1  
1 xZ(N ) C2(N ) x(N)  + ~ C2(n) J2~(_ul m, _u2"9 = ~ [x~(n) x(n) 
+ u~r(n) n2~(n ) ul(n ) + u2r(n) D22(n ) us(n)]. (2.8b) 
Here Ci(N ) ~ O, Ci(n ) ~ O, Dij(n ) ~ 0 are real-valued matrices defined for all 
n e O, i , j  = 1, 2, and ui~ z~ {ui(m),... ' ui (N _ 1)}, _u2 *" A {u2(m),..., u2(N -- 1)). 
• ~,£a,~t- i i~ ~, i ~ ~ga~%,i-i~ - -  l 2,.. ,  N°w, f ° ranv(~°~£a~*° ,~°~° ,7 i *~ __ .  ~ ~r ),r2 ~2 ~ ~' -- ' 
N --  1}, the expected (average) cost for DMi is given by 
]i(~1, ~72) : E[Ji°(-Ul °, -u2 °) I Ul(0) ~--- Y1°('), u2(0) -~ r2°(') 
.... , u i (N 1) N-1 - -  = r l  ('), u~(N- -  1) = rN-I(')], (2.9) 
where the expectation is taken with respect o the statistics of all the random 
variables, and Yi denotes the sequence of Borel functions {7i °, 7i!,..., yN-i}. 
It can be shown by standard techniques of analysis that J i (Ti ,  73) as given by 
(2.9) is well defined and finite for every fixed permissible 7i and 72. 
Equilibrium Solution 
(In what follows we shall use the notation 9i e ~c,a~ to imply the sequence 
0 ~i ° 1 ~ l  0 ~ r i x F 7/7" {r~ E ~, , 7i E ~ (7 ) , ,  7~ -~ ~'~-'c. ~2,~, 
DEFINITION 2.1. A pair {91" e ~,  93* e ~'~} is said to provide a globally 
optimal equilibrium solution for the decision problem under investigation if the 
following pair of inequalities is satisfied for all 91 e ~C*a~'I and 92 e ~:  
J~(9~*, ~2") ~< J l(~,,  92% (2.10a) 
]2(91", 93*) ~< ]2(9,*, 93). (2.10b) 
Since we are also interested in establishing the uniqueness of the global equilib- 
rium solution, we have to state precisely what we mean by that term. The 
following two definitions do that: 
DEFINITION 2.2. Any two equilibrium solutions {Agi ,/~92} and {Dgi , rn92 } 
are said to be equivalent if the following relations are satisfied: 
Ayi°(~/i° ) = Dyi°(~i° ) a.e. ~ ,o ,  (2.11a) 
/~0  
~7ii(~7i i) = Dyii(~ii ) a.e. ~, , ,  , 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . ,  . . . 
A7~-1( N-1 ) = []y~-*(N--l) a.e. ~g-*  , i = 1, 2. 
(2.11b) 
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Remark 2.1. In writing down (2.11b) above we have made use of the fact 
that under either decision strategy employed at stage zero, the random vector 
~i 1 induces identical probability measures, i.e., 
~ E]/,/IO , ~'V20 /-~ ~V10 , AV20 
~J'~] i I 
~yl 0 []y9 0 &V10 &V2 0 
whenever (2.11a) holds true. Similar reasoning also applies to the use of single 
probability measures at subsequent s ages. 
DEFINITION 2.3. If all the globally optimal equilibrium solutions of an 
_N-stage decision problem are equivalent then we say that the decision problem 
admits a unique globally optimal equilibrium solution (g.o.e.s.). 
Now, most of the remaining parts of the paper will be devoted to verification 
of the existence of a unique globally optimal equilibrium solution for the decision 
problem under consideration and derivation of the corresponding strategies for 
each DM. In doing that we shall also make use of a weaker equilibrium solution 
concept called a "stagewise optimal solution" which is defined below: 
DEFINITION 2.4. Letting Fin denote the sequence {yi°,..., 7~. -1, 7~+1,..., 7~v-1), 
we say that a pair {Yl* e ~1,  Y2* e oWr'~} constitutes a stagewise optimal solution 
if the following inequalities are satisfied for every n E 0 and every yl°~ ~0,  
72°~5~'~ °, Yl '~  ,~ ~Y /, 7~ '~e ,~ tY /, n = 1,2,..., N 1: 
71(91", "Y2 :¢) ~'~ jl(yl n,/~l~n, "Y2~), (2.12a) 
]2(,7'1", 9~*) <~ L(91", r$, , y n). (2.12b) 
Remark 2.2. It should be noted that (2.12) actually involves a set of 2N 
inequalities and by definition they are all satisfied by a globally optimal equilib- 
rium solution. This implies that a globally optimal equilibrium solution is 
necessarily also a stagewise optimal solution but not vice versa. Furthermore 
when we talk about a "unique" stagewise optimal solution we will mean it in the 
sense of Definitions 2.2 and 2.3. 
This completes the formulation of the multistage multicriteria decision 
problem to be solved in this paper. In the next section we will first give a summary 
of some of the results obtained by Basar (1975) concerning a single-stage version 
of the problem. These results will be utilized in obtaining the unique solution 
of the multistage problem. Consideration of the concept of stagewise optimality 
actually allows us to convert the N-stage decision problem with dynamic 
information into N single-stage decision problems with static information, 
equilibrium solutions of which are equivalent to stagewise optimal solutions 
of the former, provided that the dynamic nature of the information structure, 
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and the interrelations and functional dependences among the Nsingle-stage 
decision problems are carefully taken into account. Once this is done, the next 
step then would be to verify global optimality of the unique stagewise optimal 
solution. 
3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
In this section we first give the solution of a single-stage version of the 
general problem, which will be used in subsequent sections of the paper. We 
then give another useful result concerning the conditional mean of the state 
vector under the common information available to both I)M's. 
3.1. A Single-Stage Version of the Decision Problem 
Let us now consider a static decision problem characterized by the objective 
functionals 
J I (U l  :, U2) : nlTC1 x -~- ½ulTDalul @ u1TD12u2 , (3.1a) 
J2(ul , u2) = u2rC2x + ½u2TD22u2 + u2rD2iul , (3.1b) 
Dll > O, D2~ > O, 
and the observation vectors 
z 1 = H~x q- w~, (3.2a) 
z 2 = Hux -~- w 2 . (3.2b) 
Here x, wl, and w 2 are statistically independent Gaussian vectors of appropriate 
dimensions, with x ~-~ N(~, Q), w~ ~ N(0, R~), Q ~ 0, R~ > 0, i = 1, 2, and u 
and v are the decision variables of DM1 and DM2, respectively. If we denote 
by 7~ the decision law of DMi and by ~z~ and ~ the appropriate Banach spaces 
of control aws, in accordance with the formulation of Section 2, then we can 
quote the following theorem from Ba,sar (t974a, 1975): 
TrIEOREM 3.1 [Ba,sar (1974a, 1975)]. 
of any bounded real symmetric matrix ArA.  Then, if either 
~(D~D~D~D21) < 1, (3.3a) 
OF 
~(D~D21D~Dl~) < 1, (3.3b) 
the decision problem posed above admits a unique equilibrium solution {~,1" ~ S¢~, 
78* ~ Xe~22} which satisfies the pair of equations 
7i(zi) = - -D~CiE[x ]zi] - -  D~lD,jE[Ts(zj)]zi], i # j, i , j  = 1, 2 (3.4) 
Let )t( A) denote the maximum eigenvalue 
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and is given in closed form by 
7i*(zi) =A i24-B i ( z i - -H ix )  (3.5) 
where 
A~ = --[I -- D2DijD5ID~]-~D~a[C~ -- D~D~C~], i ~-j,~- " i, j ~- l, 2. (3.6) 
B 1 is given as the unique solution of the Lyapunov-type equation 
B~ 4- PB~L = M (3.7a) 
where 
P ~ --D~)Da2Di)Dzl, 
L &~ H~QHzT(H~QHz r 4- R2)-aHeQH~r(It~QH~ r 4- R~), 1, 
(3.7b) 
(3.7c) 
M ~ --D~CIQH~r(H~QHI ~ 4- R~) -~ 
4- D~DIeD~CeQHf(HeQHf 4- Re)-aHeQHIT(H~QH~ ~ 4- R~) ~ (3.7d) 
and Be is given by 
Be = --D~I[Cz 4- De~BxH~] QHer(HeQHe r 4- Re) -~. (3.8) 
3.2. An Optimal Fihering Problem 
The second auxiliary result that we shall need in the sequel is an expression 
for the mean of the state vector at every stage conditioned on the common 
information available to the DMs and for any fixed sequence of decision laws 
{yi °, 7il,..., 7~ v-l} in ~.  That is, using the notation of Section 2, the problem 
is to determine 
~(n) = E[x(n) I Z~_I], n~0,  (3.%) 
whenever x(') is given by the difference quation 
x(n+l)=F(n)x(n)+Gl(n)yln(~ln)+Ge(n)yen(~en)+v(n), x(0)=x0, (3.9b) 
for some sequence c 0 N-I~ ~7~,'",Yi in~, i  = 1,2. 
The solution to this problem can easily be obtained by a straightforward 
application of Kalman filtering theory once we formulate it within the right 
framework. To this end, we first obtain a recursive quation for 
k(n) = E[x(n) [ Z~] (3.9c) 
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and then express 
letting for each n ~ 0 
~(n) in terms of k (n -  1) via a one-step predictor. Now, 
Hr(n) ~ [HiT(n), H2r(n)], 
.~(n) ~ [~,~(n), ~(n)], 
R(n) LX diag(R~(n), R2(n)) ,
e(n) zx G~(n) yln(~, ") + G2(n ) y n(%n), 
(3.10a) 
(3.10b) 
(3.1Oc) 
(3.10d) 
we have the following lemma by direct application of the results from Kalman 
(1963): 
LEMMA 3.1. For the optimal filtering problem posed above, the conditional 
estimate ~(') is given by 
~:(n -[- 1) = F(n) &(n) + e(n) (3.11) 
where ~(n) is defined recursively by 
~(n) = [I - K(n) H(n)] F(n --  1) ~(n - -  1) + K(n) z(n) 
+ [I -- K(n) H(n)] e(n --  1), N(--1) = go; (3.12a) 
K(n) = L(n -- 1) Hr(n)[H(n)L(n -- 1) Hr(n) + R(n)]-~; (3.12b) 
L(n) = F(n) P(n)Fr(n) + 4(n); (3.12c) 
P(n) = F (n -  1)P(n- 1)Fr(n- 1 ) -  K(n)[H(n)L(n-  1)Hr(n)+ R(n)]-lKr(n) 
+ ~(n -- 1), P(--1) = Q; (3.12d) 
F(--1) & L e(-1) zx 0, q~(-1) & 0. (3.12e) 
4. MAIN RESULTS 
Now, we address ourselves first to existence of a unique stagewise optimal 
solution for the general decision problem posed in Section 2, and then to verifica- 
tion of global optimality of the derived solution. 
Let {91", Y2*} denote any stagewise optimal solution for the decision problem. 
Then, by Definition 2.4, it has to satisfy the 2N inequalities (2.12). In order to 
investigate he properties and the functional structure of any permissible decision 
law sequence that might satisfy these inequalities, let us first start with n = 
N-  1 and further proceed in a descending order. If we rewrite the relevant 
pair of inequalities for n = N -- 1, we have 
- - * - N--1 * 
J~(y, , 92*) <~ J,(r~ , V;(u_l) ,92*), (4.1a) 
Lffl , 92*) ~< v2(,~_1) Jz(yl , , yN-1), (4.1b) 
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which indicate that if {91,92} is a stagewise optimal solution, then 7 N-1 should 
~N--1 , N--2 *~2N--1 minimize the right-hand side (RHS) of (4.1a) over ~ ( y ) and 
should minimize the RHS of (4.1b) over ~c~r~f-*(*yN-2 ). Now, since ]i(91,92) 
can also be rewritten as 
fi(~71, ~72) = E[JN-I(_ul °, u~ °) -~- [Ji°(ul °, u2 °) - JiX-l(_ua °, _u~°)] 
= r~ ('), u,~(0) = >0(.),..., u~(N - -  1) = rF l ( ' ) ,  [ ul(O) o 
~(N-  1) = yU-~(.)], 
and since the second term [j0(., .) _ jN -~( . ,  .)] is functionally independent of 
both Ul (N-  1) and u~(N- -1 ) ,  the two minimization problems mentioned 
above can equivalently be defined through the following inequalities: 
where 
1N--I/* N--I ?N--I/ N--I Yl , *yN-,) ~< J* tY* , *yN--~), (4.2a) 
YN--1/* N--1 J g - ' ( *7  'N-i ,  *y  N-*) <~ J~ t 71 , yg-*) ,  (4.2b) 
I/N--l[ N--I tYl , N - l )  = E[jU-l(_ul0, _U20) i gl(0) : * 10(., .), 
u2(0 ) = ,y  0(.),..., u l (N  _ 2) = *yN-2(.), u2(N _ 2) 
= *r~-2( . ) ,  u~(N - -  1) = y~v-l(.), u~(N - -  1) = rg-2( . ) ] .  (4.2c) 
Therefore, in determining the optimal structure of the decision laws y~v-, and 
y~v2-* we can, without any loss of generality, consider the single-stage decision 
problem defined through (4.3a) and (4.3b) below, together with the inequalities 
(4.2a) and (4.2b): 
jN-1 = ½xr(N) CdN)  x (N)  + ½x*r (N  - -  1) C, (N  - -  1) x*(N  - -  1) 
+ ½ul r (N  - -  1) Di l (N  - -  1) u, (N  - -  1) 
+ ½u2T(N - -  1) Di2(N - -  1) u2(N - -  1), (4.3a) 
x(N)  = F (N  - -  1) x*(N  - -  1) q- G,(N  - -  l) u~(N - -  1) 
+ G2(N - -  1) uz(N - -  1) + v(N - -  1). (4.3b) 
The reason why we write x*(N  - -  1) instead of x(N - -  1) is to indicate that the 
state vector at n = N -- 1 is dependent on the previously selected ecision laws 
{*yx-2} and thus its probability measure is determined by those decision laws. 
Consequently the probability measure induced by x*(N  - -  1) is not necessarily 
Gaussian; what we can show though (using standard techniques of analysis) is 
that x*(N  - -  1) is necessarily a second order random variable since every %7i ~ is 
in ,i n • ,~-1 ~ i (  y ) , i= l ,2 ,  n=O, . . . ,N - -2 .  
643/38/x-3 
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Hence, if the N - -  1 pairs of stagewise optimal decisions {*y zv-2} at the previous 
stages have already been determined, then to obtain the stagewise optimal decision 
pair at the final stage one has basically to solve the following single-stage d cision 
problem. 
Auxiliary Problem 4.1 
If DN[i's objective function J~-I is given by (4.3) and ]~-~ is defined by 
]N-lt N--1 N--I tyl , Y2 ) = E[JN-I(- uN-~, -u~ -a) ] udN -- 1) = yN-~(.), i = 1, 2], (4,4) 
find the pair of decision laws {*y~ v-z ~ ~Q ~O~N-I(*,~,N-2"~ * /f--1 ~ ~..oftN-2(** N--2~,'I 
r z ~, r I ,  r e ~ Y )S 
~./N-1 :$: N--2 N--I ~ ~N-1/ ' ,~,N- -2"  ~that satisfy (4.2a)-(4.2b) for every 7~v1-1 ~~r~ ( Y ) and Y2 r~ ~ r J, 
and determine the conditions under which a unique solution will exist. 
Solution to Auxiliary Problem 4.1 
If we substitute (4.3b) into (4.3a) and multiply out the quadratic terms, then 
we observe that the preceding decision problem is equivalent to the single-stage 
decision problem of Section 3.1, with the only differences being (i) the appearance 
of the extra terms involving v(N -- 1) in the cost function (4.3a), and (ii) x*(N-- 1) 
not being necessarily Gaussian. However, both of these difficulties can easily 
be handled as follows: First of all, since v(N-  1) is statistically independent 
of all the other andom vectors and has zero mean, its appearance does not affect 
the solution at all. Moreover, since (4.4) can also be written as first conditioned 
on ZN_ ~ and then the full averaging, what becomes important is the probability 
distribution of x*(N -- 1) conditioned on ZN_Z • But this is known to be Gaussian 
with mean ~(N-  1) and covariance L(N- -2) .  This then makes auxiliary 
problem 4.1 equivalent to the problem of Section 3.1, and hence the following 
result (Lemma 4.1) follows directly from Theorem 3.1. 
Preliminary notation. 
~,~ z~ Gf (N-  1) C,(N) G~(N-  1) + D~g(N- 1) > 0, (4.5a) 
~,j A G , r (N_  1) C,(N) G~(N-  1), i @ j, (4.5b) 
13i a ~ G, r (N-  1)C i (N)F (N-  1). (4.5c) 
LEMMA 4.1. I f  either 
0"1" 
i(z57~&~z~;~zs~l) < 1 
i(;5;~ &~O;~ &~) < 1, 
(4.6a) 
(4.6b) 
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Cf~ IN-If* N--2x auxiliary problem 4.1 admits a unique solution {*y~v'- l~r, ~ y ), 
~g~/2 N-2 E #N-I ~ N--2 ~gag ( 7 )givenby 
*T/N-I(v~ -1) = AN-a~ * (N i  , - -  1) @ BN- i [ z i (N  --  1) - - / / / (N  - -  1) ~*(A T - -  1)] 
(4.7) 
where 
AN - i  - - [ I - -  ~- i~ - - i -  - i~- I  ~ • = Dii DijDji  Dji] Dii [Dia - -  bijD~lJOja], 
i=/=j,i , j= 1,2, (4.8) 
and Bf  -~ is given as the unique solution of the Lyapunov-type equation 
+ = :o  (4.9) 
where pN-, is given by (3.7b) with Dij replaced by/3ij,/~N-1 is given by (3.7c) 
with Hi, Ri, Q replaced by Hi(N -- 1), RI(N -- 1), andL(N -- 2), respectively, 
and _/lg N-1 is given by (3.7d) under the same modifications. Furthermore B N-1 
is given by (3.8) under the replacements mentioned above and with C~ replaced 
by Z32a. Finally, ~:*(N- 1) is given by (3.11) with e(n) replaced by e*(n). 
This statement thus completes the solution to auxiliary problem 4. I. It should 
, . . ~N- - I  mN- - I  9. be noted at this pomt that as a mapping between (R ~ , ~ ~ ) and (R 4, ~,~) 
the structure of the optimal decision rule "7~ v-a as given by (4.7) depends on 
the decision laws picked at previous tages. That is, in order to be able to say 
whether "7~-107~ -i) is linear in r~f -1 or not, we definitely have to know the 
structure of the previous decision laws. But this information is not available 
ahead of time because of the very nature of the problem; moreover in order to be 
able to determine the optimal structure of the previous decision laws, we have 
to know the optimal structure of the last-stage decision so that a recursive 
procedure can work. Now, in order to resolve this dilemma, we make the following 
crucial observation: 
The functional dependence of ,y~v-l(~-l) on z i (N-  1) is independent of
the previous decision rules, and this property of the optimal solution at stage 
N -- 1 is sufficient for the recursive procedure to work. We thus have: 
L~MMA 4.2. If  {91", 92*} is a globally optimal equilibrium solution or a 
stagewise optimal solution for the multistage decision problem under considera- 
tion, then the dependence of ,7~v-~(~?}v-~) on z i (N-  1) is determined through 
the affine transformation 
aN- i rv - -~(7  ~ (4.10a) g'~'N--I(7]N--1) = BN- l z i (N -  l) -~ *i ~i kaN-2], 
A~ -1 &/ / iN  -1 - B~- IH , (N  - -  1), (4.10b) 
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where l N-I is an element of the Banach space ~°ZN-2(*r~-a ) and is defined at 
equilibrium (in terms of .yN-a) as follows: 
*l/- l(zN_~) = ~*(ar  _ 1), i = 1, 2. (4.11) 
COROLLARY TO LEMMA 4.2. In the investigation of the equilibrium solution of 
the general multistage decision problem under consideration, the permissible decision 
laws at stage n = N-  1 can be restricted, without any loss of generality, to the 
functional form (4.10) where lN-1 is an arbitrary element of ~ZN-2(*Tn-z ). 
After thus concluding investigation of the properties of the permissible 
decision laws that satisfy inequalities (2.12) for n = N-  1, let us now look at 
the same set of inequalities for n = N -- 2. This time the relevant pair of 
inequalities are 
]1 (71" ,7~*)  ~< - N -~ * J1(7~ ,/~£(N-2) ,972"), (4.12a) 
k(?71 *, ~72") ~< J2(91",/'~N-2), 7~-~), (4.12b) 
which indicate that if (91", 7z*} is a stagewise optimal solution, then "7~ -2 
should minimize the RHS of (4.12a)over o~°~N-~(*y N-z) and *7 N-2 should minimize 
the RHS of (4.12b) over ,~-~ • ~-3 ~og ( Y ). Now, following a reasoning similar to the 
one that ted to (4.2), we conclude that the above minimization problems are 
equivalent to the ones defined by the following inequalities: 
~N--2[* N--2 fN--2z N--2 
.1 t r l  , %~-~) <~ Jl t~l , *rf-~), 
ffN--2t* N--2 ~N--2z* N--2 N--2 
t rl , * r f -~)~<J~ ~7~ , r~  ), 
(4.13a) 
(4.13b) 
where 
jN- -2z  N--2 N--2 
i t71 ,7~ ) 
~= E[J~V-2(u-1 °, -u~ °) I u~(0) = "71°(.), u2(0) = *72°('),.., ul(N --  2) 
__ N--2 -- y~ ('), u~(N --  2) = 7N-2('), u~(N -- 1) = "7N-1('), u~(N -- 1) 
= *yN-I(')]. (4.13C) 
Now, before we attempt to perform the optimization with respect o 7~ -~ and 
7~ -2, we have to express f~-~ and fN-2 in terms of y~ r-~ and y~-~, explicitly. 
jv~_~ is definitely a function of *y~ r-~ and *72 w-~ which are known to be equilib- 
rium solutions, but quite arbitrary otherwise. However, by the Corollary to 
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Lemma 4.2, we can take "7/N-~ to be linear in z i (N  - -  1) which is the only term 
that depends on y~-2 and 7~ -~. Moreover, since &(N -- 1) is linear in ul(N -- 2) 
and u~.(N -- 2), we are again faced with a static decision problem with a quadratic 
cost function. To see this better, let us rewrite j~v_~ as follows (by also making 
use of Corollary to Lemma 4.2): 
]~-~. = EIlN-2tu N-~, J~  ,_ , y~-2)]u,(N -- 2) = y~-2(.),j = 1, 2]; (4.14a) 
, i  ,_~ , _u N-~) £ + ½,,~(N -- 2) D~(N -- 2) u~(N - -  2) 
4- ½uzT(N -- 2)D,~(N -- 2)u2(N -- 2) 4- ½xr(N -- 2)C,(N -- 2)x(N -- 2); 
(4.14b) 
fN - ,  A E rrg-1;uN--* u_g-1)[u,(N-- 1) = * N-, , ,  • • = Y--ltYi ~-1 , yj ( '), j  = 1,2]. (4.14C) 
Here *y~-~(-) is defined by (4.10a) for arbitrary lN-l, and En_x[" ] denotes the 
expectation operation with respect to the statistics of the random vectors 
v(N-  1), w,(N-  1), and w2(N-  1). Consequently, j~N-~ can be expressed 
uniquely by the following quadratic expressions: 
f7  -~ = ½,?'(N -- l) di(N -- 1) x(ee -- 1) + S(N  -- 1) 0i~(lV -- 1)!(N -- 1) 
4- ½_/r(N -- 1) 0~(N -- 1)/(N -- 1) @ ~q(N -- 1); (4.15a) 
Oi ( ]~ - -  1) = C i (N  - -  1) ~- [F(N -- l) @ G~(N -- 1) BN-~H~(N -- 1) 
4- G2(N -- 1) B~-aHz(N -- 1)] T. Ci(N)[F( N _ 1) 
+ G I (N-  1)BN- IH~(N-  1) @ G2(N-  1)BN-~H2(N- l)] 
2 
@ ~ [BN-~Hj (N-  1)]rD~j(N-  l )BN-~Hj (N-  1); (4.15b) 
j=l  
c~(x -  1) 
!(N - 1) £ [(g-lT, (g -1)T;  (4.15c) 
- ([AN-~)r G~ ~(N-- 1)C~(N)[F(N-- l) + Ga(N-- I )BN-~H~(N - 1) 1 
+C~(N--1)B~-~H~(N--I)] +(AT ~)~D~:(N--1)B~-~H~(N--1) 
( A N-~) TG2 r(N-- 1)C,( N)[F( N - -  1 ) + G~( N- -  1)Bi~-*H~( N - 1) + G2(N-- 1) 
• Bg-aHz(N - 1)] q- (~4 N-~) TD,2 (X - -  1 )Bg-~Hz(N - 1) 
(4.15d) 
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d. (N-  1) 
"(z{N-1)r[Glr(N--1)Ci(N--I)GI(N--1) (A~-a)rGtr(N--1)C~(N--1) ] 
+D~a(N-- 1)]AN-~ " G'~(N--1)AN-~ ! l ;  
(A~-~)rGJ(N--1)C~(N--1) ('4~-~)r[G~r(N--1)CdN--1) ] 
• G~(N--1)~/~ - • G2(N--1)+D~(N--1)]~iN-~J 
(4.15e) 
~odN- l) = ½ Tr{[G~(N- l )BN-t]rC~(N)Gt(N- 1)BN-~Ra(N- l) 
@ [Gz(N *--- 1) BN-1]TCi(N) G2(N -- 1) BN-1R2(N -- 1) 
+ Ci(N)¢(N-  1) + [BN-1]TDil(N- 1)BN-1RI(N- l) 
+ LrBN-~lrD2 , i2~(N-- 1) BN-1R~(N-- 1)}. (4.15f) 
Hence, in order to determine the optimal structure of the decision rules ~,~-~ 
and N-2 Y~ , we have to solve a static two-person two-criteria decision problem that 
is similar to the auxiliary problem 4.1, and consequencely itssolution will be of 
the same nature, but with one important additional feature. This time, we also 
have to determine the relation between the solution found and the arbitrarily 
picked functions l N-1 and l N-2, and further extend this relation to other stages. 
In the sequel, we will accomplish this through an inductive argument, i.e., (i) we 
will assume a quadratic structure for the cost functions at stage n @ 1, (ii) we 
will determine the optimal solution under this quadratic structure, (iii) we will 
make use of the equilibrium consistency condition to obtain expressions in 
closed form, and finally (iv) we will verify that the single-stage decision problem 
is of the same nature (with n @ 1 replaced by n). Details of this inductive 
argument are given in the Appendix, and it leads us to the important Theorem 
4.1. 
Preliminary notation. New terms and notation used in Theorem 4.1 (unless 
otherwise stated, i =/=j, and i,j = l, 2): 
O~(n) ~ Gir(n) 0~(n + 1) G~(n) + D¢~(n); (4.16a) 
D,j(n) z~ GJ(n) C~(n + 1) G~(n); (4.16b) 
/)~a(n) ~ GJ(n)O~(n 4- 1)F(n); (4.16c) 
D r tn ~lr" (4.16d) ~)i4(n) ~ GiT(n) Cij(n @ l)  [])Tl(n), i42', 11 , 
Ai n = - -  [ I  - -  ~ l (n )  Di j(n) D~. l (n) / ) j i (n) ] - lD~l(n)  
× [/Sia(n ) --/_5ij(n) Z3~l(n) Dj3(n)]. (4.17) 
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B1 ~ is an (rl × n)-dimensional matrix that solves uniquely the following 
Lyapunov-type matrix equation: 
where 
fi'~ & --LS~-~(n)/)t2(n)/)~(n)/)21(n); (4.18b) 
L~ ~= H~(n)L(n -- 1)/t~(.)[H~(~) L(~ -- 1) H~(n) + R~(n)]-~H~(.) 
• L(n --  1) Hlr(n)[Hl(n)L(n --  I) H~r(n) + Rl(n)]-~; (4.18c) 
~rn =a [zSr((n)z)l~(n)tS;)(n)tsar(.) L ~ -- 1)gJ(.)[H~(n) L(n -- l) 
• LrJ(.) + R~(n)]-~H~(n) -- Z~;~(n) Z~3(,)] n(~ -- 1) H~(~) 
• [Hl(n ) L(n --  1) H~r(n) q- R~(n)]-~; (4.18d) 
and L(') is given by (3.12@ Furthermore, 
B~" = --Z);)(n)[5~(n) + t)~B~nH~(n)] n(n -- 1) HJ(n) 
• [Ha(n )L(n -- 1) H~r(n) -? R2(n)]-~; (4.19) 
~i  n ~ i i  n - -  BinHi(n);  (4 .20)  
2 
O~j(n) ~ O~j(.) + Z [)~('~) ~n+~ A  G (n), i , j  = 1, 2; (4.21a) 
k=l 
2 
Dis(n) ~ O/a(n) @ Z ~i4k(n) A~+~F(n) • (4.21b) 
7c=i 
Ci('), Cij('), and C~i(') are matrices of dimensions p × p, p × (ra @ r2), and 
(r 1 ~-r2)× (r, @ r2), respectively, and are defined through the following 
difference quations: 
+U(~) dij(~ + 1)P '~ + TM ~ ~r IF ] c,.(~ + l)P(n) 
2 
+ Y~ [B,?Hk(n)VD~,~(-)B~"H~(n), d~(N) = CdN); (4.22) 
/c=1 
+ [Pn] ~5~(~(.) + [P"] ~Sij(~ + l) ~"  
2 
+ ~ [Bz~"H,~(n)]rDik(n) A,~I,~, Cij(N) = 0; (4.23) 
7c=1 
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~i,(n) = 0r(n) ~,(n @ 1) G(n) ~- ~r(n) C,j(n @ ]) 0/n 
• [~"]TC~(n + 1) ~(n) + [~"]T~.(n + 1) ~" + D?, 
C,(N) = 0; (4.24) 
F(n) ~ F(n) -]- G~(n) Bx'~H~(n) -~ G2(n ) B~"H2(n); (4.25a) 
9. 
F(n) £ F(n) K(n) H(n) + ~ G,~(n) Bk~H~(n); (4.25b) 
k=l 
^~ i, j  = 102; (4.25c) Bij ~ F(n) Kj(n) + Gj(n) Bj", 
K(n) ~ [Kl(n), K2(n)] , p × (m 1 + m2), (4.25d) 
where K(') is given by (3.12b) and H(.) by (3.10a); 
-P'~ £ [-#r(n),-Pr(n)lr; (4.25e) 
~(n) & [Gl(n ) A"~% G2(n)A~2"~], p × 2p; (4.25f) 
G,(n) = F(n)[I -- K(n) H(n) + G~(n) Ai(n); (4.25g) 
~j(n) = Gj(n) A~. ~, i ® j; (4.25h) 
~,~ ~ [(~l~(n) 012(n)]" (4.25i) 
: L~21(n) C;~2(n)J' 
11 A= [I, 0], I: p × p identity matrix; (4.25j) 
I~ & [0, I], I: p X p identity matrix; (4.25k) 
D~n zx diag((~l-)rD~l(n) A1 ., (~n)rD~(n) X2,~). (4.251) 
EXrST~NCE CONmTmN 4.1. (i) For each n E 0,/311(n) and/)22(n) are positive 
definite (0 zx {0, 1, . ,  N -- 1}). 
(ii) For each n ~ 0, the square matrices/311(n ) and/32z(n ) are invertible. 
(iii) For each n 6 0, at least one of the following two inequalities i satisfied 
(here A(A) denotes the maximum eigenvalue of any bounded real symmetric 
matrix drA): 
A(/3~(n)/3~2(n ) J0~-~(n)/321(n)) < 1; (4.26a) 
~(/3~-~(n)/32~(n )/3i-~(n )/3r~(n)) < 1. (4.26b) 
THEOREM 4.1. Under condition 4.1, the Lyapunov matrix equation (4.18a) 
admits a unique solution Bin for each n ~ O. Furthermore, under the same condition, 
the multistage decision problem under consideration admits a unique stagewise 
optimal solution given recursively by 
*y1"(~71") = dl"~*(n) + Bl"[zl(n ) -- H~(n) ~*(n)], (4.27a) 
*Y~"(~7~") = A2n~*(n) + B2"[z~(n) -- Ha(n) ~:*(n)], n ~ 0 (4.27b) 
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and with 
~*(n) = F(n -- 1)~*(n -- 1) + G~(n -- 1)*7~-a(') + G2(n -- !)*~,~-~('), (4.28) 
where ~*(') is given by (3.12a) with e(') replaced by e*('), and it denotes the 
conditional mean of the state vector x(') given the common state information 
and the calculated equilibrium values of the past decision rules. 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It is provided in the Appendix. 
COROLLARY TO THEOREM 4.1. The unique optimal solution for the multistage 
decision problem is linear in the dynamic information available to each DM; i.e., 
it is possible to find appropriate dimensional matrices {A~(j, h)} and vectors {A~(k)} 
such that for each n ~ 0 we have 
2 n--1 
*y~(,h '~) = At(l, n) za(n ) @ ~ ~ At(j, h) z~(k) + A~(n), (4.29a) 
j= l  /e=0 
2 n--1 
= A (2, n) + A (j, h) + (4.29b) 
j=l /~=0 
and this representation is unique in terms of the coefficient matrices, and vectors 
{A~(k)}. 
Proof of the Corollary. This result follows readily from the recursive Kahnan 
filter equations given by Lemma 3.1. The matrices {Ai(j, k)} and vectors {A~(k)} 
can in fact be explicitly determined as functions of the parameters ofthe decision 
problem. 
Since the decision laws (4.27) constitute a stagewise optimal solution, they 
satisfy the pair of inequalities (2.12) for each n ~ 0. Now, the optimality of these 
decision laws can even be strengthened by verifying that they also satisfy the 
original inequalities (2.10), that is, the pair (4.27) is a globally optimal equilibrium 
solution. This verification can be accomplished by resorting to certain standard 
results of stochastic ontrol theory. 
THEOREM 4.2. Under condition 4.1, the &cision laws (4.27a)-(4.27b) constitute 
the unique globally optimal equilibrium solution for the multistage decision 
problem posed in Section 2 and under the one-step delay observation sharing patter . 
Proof of Theorem 4.2. In order to prove the desired result it will be sufficient 
to show that the decision law sequence {*yl ~} minimizes the objective functional 
jvl(9l, ~=*) and {'72 ~} minimizes J2(~1", 9z), because then uniqueness follows 
directly from Theorem 4.1 since every globally optimal equilibrium solution is, 
by definition, also a stagewise optimal solution. 
The first minimization problem that we referred to above can be formulated 
40 TAMER BA~AR 
as a stochastic optimal control problem as follows: Starting with the expression 
of "72~(') as given by (4.29b) and substituting this into the state equation (2.1) 
for ue('), we have 
x(n 4- 1) = IF(n) 4- G2(n) A2(2, n) Hz(n)] x(n) + G~(n) ua(n ) 4- G2(n) Az(n) 
2 n- -1  
+ A (L k) + e (n) A (2, n) + 
j=z k=o (4,30a) 
and substitution of the same expression into the cost functional (2.8a) further 
yields 
L( I, 
1 1 N-1 
= E xr(N) Ca(N ) x(N) -+- ~ ~ {xr(n) C~(n) x(n) -I- u~r(n) Ol1(//) ul(n )
~=9 
+ [xr(n) H2r(n) A=r(2, n) -]- ,~2r(n)] Dae(n)[A2(2 , n) Ha(n )x(n) + ;~2(n)] 
+ 2[xr(n)H2T(n)Azr(2, n) + A2r(n)]D,2(n)T.(z) + T.r(z)D~z(n)T~(z)}] 
+ Tr ~ D~2(n ) A2(2, n) R2(n ) A2r(2, n) , (4.30b) 
2 n--1 
T~(z) A= Z ~ A2(j, k)zj(k). (4.30c) 
j=l  7c=0 
Equations (4.30a) and (4.30b) now define a generalized linear quadratic stochastic 
control problem together with the classical information structure (3.10b). Since 
Tn(z) is only a function of {zl(0), z2(0),..., z2(N -- 1)} for each n ~ 0, it is measur- 
able with respect to the information field at every n ~ 0. Furthermore, since Tn(z) 
enters the state equation linearly and the objective function quadratically, 
Jz(71, ~z*) is a strictly convex function of {ul(n), n ~ 0} and the classical separa- 
tion theorem of stochastic optimum control applies (Witsenhausen, 1971). 
Every minimizing solution of this problem can thus be obtained via dynamic 
programming, and this implies that inequalities (2.12a) necessarily imply 
inequality (2.10a). 
It should be clear that a similar easoning verifies the equivalence of(2.12b) and 
(2.10b) for the decision problem under consideration. This completes the proof 
of the statement that (4.27a)-(4.27b) satisfy inequalities (2.10) uniquely. 
Remark 4.1. In the formulation of the multistage decision problem in 
Section 2, we assumed the matrices Dl~(n ) and D21(n ) to be positive definite for 
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all n E 0. However, we can actually relax this severe restriction since the only 
place where we made use of this positive definiteness requirement was in the 
proof of Theorem 4.2 above in establishing the convexity of the cost functionals 
]1(71,72") and J2(71", 72). We note that Theorem 4.1 will still be valid if DI~(') 
and D21 (-) are taken to be arbitrary square matrices of appropriate dimensions. 
Hence, for the purpose of gaining generality, we can assume f1(71,72") to be 
convex in {ul(n), n ~ 0} and ]2(71,72") to be convex in {u~(n), n ~ 0} to replace 
Dl~(n ) > O, D21(n ) > O, n ~ O. 
5. THE SPECIAL CASE OF A SINGLE OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONAL 
One special (but general enough) version of the multistage decision problem 
of Section 2 is the case when the two objective functionals are equivalent, or in 
other words, when the decision makers have a single objective functional to 
optimize. The decision problem is then known as a LQG team problem and its 
globally optimal solution is known as a team optimal solution. For this special 
case, our definition of an equilibrium solution (Definition 2.1) leads in general 
to person-by-person ptimality which coincides with team optimality if the cost 
function satisfies the right convexity conditions. Let us now consider the LQG 
team problem defined as in the formulation of Section 2, but with a single 
cost functional J ( ' ,  ") ~ Jl°( ", '), where the latter is defined by (2.8a). Concerning 
the team solution of this problem, the following result easily follows from 
Theorems 4.1 and 4.2. 
THEOREM 5.1. The two-person team problem posed above, and with the 
decentralized one-step observation sharing pattern, admits a unique team optimal 
solution under the conditions of Theorem 4.1, and the optimal strategies are defined 
as in Theorem 4.1 with only D~l(n ) =~ Dn(n), D22(n ) =~ D~z(n), Ca(n ) =-- C~(n). 
Proof of Theorem 5.1. It readily follows from Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 that, 
for this sepcial case, the strategies given in Theorem 4.1 constitute a unique 
person-by-person ptimal solution. Furthermore, since dr( -, .) is strictly convex 
in the pair {-u~ - l ,  -2uN-I~, and since every team optimal solution is by definition 
also person-by-person optimal, the result easily follows. 
Remark 5.1. Theorem 5.1 states that the team optimal solution is unique 
under the one-step delay observation sharing pattern. At this point one might ask 
the question, as to whether other (new and better) team optimal solutions emerge 
if we inciude knowledge of the past actions in the information structure. We now 
argue that, since we have a single-criterion problem, under the amended informa- 
tion pattern it is not possible to produce solutions that are better (i.e., yield a 
lower average value for the cost function) than the solution given in Theorem 5.1. 
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Let us assume to the contrary for the moment, that is, there exists a pair of 
strategies under the amended information structure that yields a lower average 
value for the cost function. However, because of causality, this solution can 
uniquely be expressed in terms of only the relevant observation vectors, and this 
constitutes a contradiction with the global optimality of the solution of Theorem 
5.1 under the original information structure. Hence, by including knowledge 
of the previous actions in the information pattern, the value of the cost function 
cannot be lowered any further in a team problem, and one can, without any loss 
of generality, deal with the original information structure. 
Remarh 5.2. Optimality of an affine unique team solution for the LQG 
dynamic team problem and under the one-step delay sharing pattern has earlier 
been asserted in Witsenhausen (1971) and proven in Ho and Chu (1972). 
Exact expressions for the unique solution, however, were obtained later quite 
independently and using different methods by Kurtaran and Sivan (1974), 
Sandell and Athans (1974), and Yoshikawa (1975). 
Another extreme case of the class of multicriteria decision problems 
considered in this paper would be the situation when Jl(', " )~ - J2( ' ,  "), 
that is a zero-sum dynamic game in which DM1 is minimizer, DM2 the maxi- 
mizer, and the objective functional is J =- .[1(', "). Definitely, in this case, we 
have to remove the positive-definiteness requirements on certain matrices in 
the cost functions; but, nevertheless, one can show that, if the equivalence 
relations 
--fiD12(n ) ~ Dn(n ) > O, 
--[3D~2(n) ~ D12(n ) < 0, 
-,ec~(~) = c,(n) > o, 
hold for some ]3 > 0, and if J (ul ,  P2*) and J(~l*, u~) are, respectively, strictly 
convex in u 1 and strictly concave in u2, then the solution {~1", P2*} given in 
Theorem 4.1 provides a unique saddle point pair for the zero-sum dynamic 
game posed above. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main results of this paper are embedded in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 which 
state that the class of multistage LQG decision problems characterized by two 
decision makers and a one-step delay observation sharing pattern admit unique 
affine noncooperative equilibrium solutions. The exact expressions given in 
Theorem 4.1 indicate that the unique optimal policy of DMi at stage n is a 
linear mapping on his current observation zi(n) plus a linear mapping on ~*(n), 
where ~*(n) denotes the conditional mean of x(n) given the common observation 
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data of the players and under the calculated equilibrium decision rules at previous 
stages. Since ~:*(n) is not directly available to the decision makers, a mathem- 
atically more precise way of expressing the optimal decision rules is to write 
them in the structural form given in the Corollary to Theorem 4.1. We note, 
however, that if each DM were also given the past actions of the other DM, 
then a policy of the form 
r? (n ,  ~) = A,~C(n) + B,~[~,(n) - H,(n) 8(n)] (6.1) 
would be permissible for DMi, but the optimal coefficient matrices would then 
be different han those given in Theorem 4.1. This difference is mainly due to 
the fact that ~:(n) used in (6.1) above is directly a function of the past decision 
rules, while ~*(n) used in Theorem 4.1 depends on the past decision rules only 
through the past observations. Moreover, as it has been pointed out in Section 1 
and in more detail in Basar (1976b), the equilibrium solution obtained under 
the structural form (6.1) would be one out of uncountably many different 
equilibrium solutions obtainable under the one-step delay information sharing 
pattern. For the dynamic team problem of Section 5, however, such problems 
definitely do not arise. 
In obtaining the desired uniqueness result under the one-step delay observa- 
tion sharing pattern, and in the actual derivation of the corresponding strategies, 
we have adopted an approach that leads to solving a series of static decision 
problems, by carefully taking into account he functional links between two 
consecutive static problems. If the information structure had been the one-step 
delay sharing pattern and if the strategies had been fixed at the structural form 
(6.1), then it would be possible to directly extend the procedure of Sandell and 
Athans (1974) developed for the team problem, and thus determine the functional 
link between two consecutive static problems rather easily. However, by the 
very nature of the one-step delay observation sharing pattern, ~:(n) is not directly 
available at stage n, and hence the above mentioned standard procedure is not 
valid for this problem. This then leads, by necessity, to the rather intricate 
induction argument given in Sections 4 and 7. To illustrate the difference 
between the standard induction argument and the one given in this paper, the 
reader is especially refered to the argument leading from Lemma 7.1 to Lemmas 
7.2 and 7.3. 
As a final remark, it should be mentioned that if the information structure of 
the multicriteria LQG decision problem is characterized by an n-step delay 
observation sharing pattern with n /> 2, then the problem will, in general, 
admit nonlinear equilibrium solutions, as it has earlier been shown by Witsen- 
hausen (1968) for the special case of a team problem. It is also well known that 
for the special case of a zero-sum game, a two-step delay observation sharing 
pattern might still lead to unique linear equilibrium solutions (Basar and Mintz 
(1972)). 
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7. APPENDIX 
In this appendix we provide a proof for Theorem 4.1 of Section 4. 
Starting with the definition of a stagewise optimal solution as given by (2.12), 
let us first write those inequalities for stage n -t- 1 : 
]i(Yl*,.Y2*) ~< ]1(7[ +1, Y*(~+~), "2z*), (7.1a) 
J2(Yl*, ~Tz*) ~ j8(~71",/~*(.+1), 75+1) • (7.1b) 
Since Ji(f'l, Y'~) can also be written as 
T o/u o v~+lr- o u~)  
L (~I ,  98) = E[7~+1(-"1 °, -"'?) + j i  ~_1, _u£) - -  j~ ~1,  
0 . 72 (), 1,1(o) = 71 ( ) ,  ,~(o) = 7~°(.),..., u l ( i  - 1) = , , -1 .  
.~(N-  1) = vf-l(.)], (7.2) 
and since [ j0(. ,  .) _ j~+l(., .)] is independent of both ul(n q- 1) and us(n @ 1), 
E~e4 (7 ) ,  (7.1a) and (7.1b) can equivalently be written as follows for all y~ +l "'°+~ * ~ 
n+l ~+i , n.  
7a~+lt, +1 ,7~+1) ~,+l. ,+l ,7~+1), (7.3a) Yl , ~< J1 tYl , 
j n+ l / *  n+l .7~+i )  Y~z+l/* ,+1 ,+1, (7.3b) 
2 k 71 , ~ J2 k 71 ,72  1, 
where 
n+l 0 7n+l/ n+l -+i'~ A E[Ji (u i  , ~2°) ] Ul(0) = "77( ' ) ,  Ji tYl ,Y~ ) = 
u~(O) = ,7° ( . ) , . . . ,  u@,) = .7~( . ) ,  u~(n) = "7~"(), 
ux(n @ 1) = 7~"+l''t'J, us(n -+- 1) = 72"+1("k ' ' ' ' "  gl(N - -  1) : *T f - - l ( ' ) ,  
u~(N-  1) = *y2N-l(')]- (7.3c) 
Now, let us assume that the decision laws {'71 k, "78 k, k = N - -  1, N - -  2,..., 
n -1- 2} are as given in Theorem 4.1. Then inequalities (7.3a)-(7.3b) define a 
static quadratic decision problem which is assumed to admit a unique solution 
under the conditions of Theorem 4.1 and in the form 
"7i"+1( ,+l~v,i , =A i "+ l~*(n+ 1) + B~.+~[zi(n + 1) - -  Hi(n + I) $*(n + 1)], 
i=  1,2. (7.4) 
As in the case of Lemma 4.2, we can rewrite these in the following form: 
. .+l. ~+1. n+l 1) 3~+iln+atY ~ (7.5a) 7i (~i ) = Bi zi(n @ @'~i  "t x~nJ, 
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where e~ +x is given by (4.20) and l~ +~ is an element of the Banach space 
5¢z-(*y ~-1) and is defined at equilibrium as follows: ~0 
*l'~+~(Zn) = ~*(n 4- 1), i = 1, 2. (7.5b) 
Now, we assume that if the decision law sequence {'71 ~, "72 ~, k = N -- 1 ..... 
n q- 2} is as given by Theorem 4.1, and if {'7~ +1, *73 +1} is in the structural 
form (7.5a), then substitution of these expressions into ]~+1 and taking 
expectation with respect to the statistics of {v(N-  1),..., v(n q-1), 
wl(N -- 1) ..... wl(n -}- 1), w2(N -- 1),..., w2(n 4- 1)} yields the following expres- 
^ 
sion (to be denoted by ]~+1) which corresponds to (4.15a): 
)~.+~ = ½xr(n 4- 1) Ci(n 4- 1) x(n 4= 1) + xr(n -+- 1) C~(n 4- l)](n 4- 1) 
4-½f f (n+l )  C~(n-t-1)_l(n@l)+~v~(n+l),  i -~ j , i , j= l ,2 .  
(7.6) 
Here, Ci('), C'~j(-), and d~i(') are defined by (4.22), (4.23), and (4.24), respectively, 
and ~oi(n -}- 1) is a constant independent of all the other random vectors and 
control aws. _/(-) is a 2p-dimensional vector in the form 
_/(n + 1) = [I~+~(Z~) r l~+~(Z,~)r] r, (7.7) 
and is defined at equilibrium by (7.5b). 
To sum up, we have so far made the following assumptions: 
ASSUMPTION 1. Theorem 4.1 is valid for stages (N-  i) to (n q- 2), and at 
stage n + 1 the equilibrium solution of the single-stage decision problem is 
given uniquely by (7.4) and under the existence conditions of Theorem 4.1. 
Consequently, in investigating the equilibrium solution at stage (n + 1), we can, 
without any loss of generality, restrict ourselves to expressions (7.5a). 
ASSUMPTION 2. Under this equilibrium solution and with If +z, o21~+1 taken 
as arbitrary elements of appropriate Banach spaces, the expected (average) cost 
^ 
function jrg+l at stage n + 1 can be written as in (7.6). 
Now, under these two assumptions, we will determine the equilibrium solution 
of the single-stage decision problem at stage n and verify that its features are 
identical to the ones given above with only n q- 1 replaced by n. Since these 
assumptions are already valid for n = N -- 1 (Section 4), this will conclude the 
proof of the Theorem. 
To determine the equilibrium solutions at stage n, we first start with inequal- 
ities (2.12) and following the reasoning that led from (7.1) to (7.3), we can write 
down the equivalent set of inequalities 
jtn(*71 ~, "7~ n) <~ j1~(71 ~, "72~); (7.8a) 
]2"(*~'1", *~'~") ~ ]2"(*~'1", 72"); (7.8b) 
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~n,"t* . . . .  1~ i = 1, 2. Here ]i n is defined by (7.3c) with n @ 1 to hold for all~i "e  ~t  r J, 
replaced by n, or equivalently (as in the ease of (4.14)) by 
]i" = E[~i"(u_~ , u_~")l u~(n) = Yi"('), i = 1, 2], (7.9a) 
nfU n U n] .fn+l ~i k-1 , -2 ] = " + ½.1~(n) D . (n )  . l (n )  
+ ½,,~(n) Di~(-) ,~(,) + ½x~(n) Ci(n) ~(n). (7.9b) 
Substitution of (7.6) into (7.9b) further yields 
]¢ ( , ,~(n) ,  u~(n)) 
= ½[Fx* @ Gzu 1 q- G2u~ @ v]rCi(n + 1)[Fx* @ Glul -1- G2uz -/v] 
+ [Fx* + G~u~ + G2u2 + v]rCi~(n + 1) !(n + 1) 
-q- ½_/r(n -~ 1) Oi~(n q- 1)](n q- 1) + ~,(n ÷ 1) @ ½x*rCi(n) x* 
@ ½UlTDilUl @ ½u2TDi2u2. (7.9c) 
Here all vectors and matrices assume their values at stage n, unless otherwise 
noted, that is u z A uz(n), uz A u2(n), Da A Dil(n) ..... Furthermore, we use 
star as a super index for x A x(n) in order to emphasize its dependence on the 
decision laws {.7~-1}. Hence, the probability measure induced by x* is not 
necessarily Gaussian, though since each "7i ~ is in" ~ivi e(,Te-1) for {i = 1, 2, k -~ 
0,..., n --  1}, x* is a second-order random variable. While considering inequalities 
(7.8) we further note that (i) the cost functions (7.9c) are quadratic in u a and u2, 
(ii) since the observation vectors are linear in the state, Bi n has finite second-order 
moments and by hypothesis l~+l(Z~) is also a second-order random vector, and 
(iiD ~e'~"t*~,~-l~ are Banach spaces. Consequently, for the static decision problem ] ~'l \ g ] 
at stage n defined by inequalities (7.8), we can write down an equation similar 
to (3.4) for the optimal solutions to satisfy. This is done below in Lemma 7.1. 
Preliminary notation. 
Dii zx Dis(n) = G~r(n) ~i(n + 1) Gi(n) + D~i(n), i = 1, 2; (7.10a) 
/)ij A /)~j(n) = Gir(n) Ci(n q- 1) G~(n), i v~ j, i , j  = 1, 2; (7.10b) 
b.iz A= Dis(n) = Gf(n) Oi(n 4:- 1)F(n), i = 1, 2; (7.10c) 
jOi, A= jOia(n ) = Gir(n) ~i~(n -~ 1), i vL j, i , j  = 1, 2; (7.10d) 
A ~,+1 = diag(~+l,  ~;+1), (7.10e) 
where Ai '~ is defined by (4.20). 
CONDIT ION 7.1.  
/3n(n) > 0 (7.11a) 
and 
9=(n) > 0. (7.1 lb) 
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LE~m 7.1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of decision laws 
{)'~'~5¢'~"t*~,~-~ . . . .  ~'~"(*~,~-z~ to satisfy (7.8) are (i) condition 7.1, 
(ii) that they should satisfy the following relations (7.12) simultaneously: 
1)-1/) E ~ n, ~, -- ~i ~s t)'~t~J)[~7~], i@ j , i , j  1,2. (7.12) 
Proof of Lemma 7.1. Condition 7.1 guarantees that ]n  and ]~ are strictly 
convex in ul(n ) and u2(n ), respectively. Furthermore, v(n) is a zero-mean random 
vector which is statistically independent ofall the other relevant random variables. 
Consequently, Lemma 7.1 follows from standard results of stochastic optimum 
control theory. 
Now, in order to solve for ),i n from (7.12) we have to make use of the expression 
for ](n -]- 1) at equilibrium as given by (7.7) and (7.5b). After substituting (7.7) 
into (7.12), we observe that the optimal "7i ~ should satisfy the following relations: 
E[O,(n)*yi'(") + 3~j*/s~(') + Oi~(n)x*(n) 1~¢ ~] = O, i vaj, i,j = 1, 2, (7.13) 
where 
2 
A~ Gj(n), i , j=  1,2; (7.14a) 
k=* 
A~ +~ £ A~ +~ -- Bg+*Hdn + 1), i = 1, 2; (7.14b) 
2 
O~3(n ) zx iO~3(n ) + ~ ~a~(n)A~+~F(n), i = 1, 2; (7.14c) 
lc=l 
2 
O~4(n) AJ(n + 1) & ~ O~4~(n) A~+ll2.+l(Z,), i = 1, 2. (7.14d) 
/c=l 
In writing down (7.13), we have actually made use of relation (3.11) and the 
property E[N*(n)]~,~] ~ E[x*(n)]w~]. We now note that the probability 
distribution function of x*(n) conditioned on Z~_ 1 is Gaussian with mean ~*(n) 
and covariance L(n -  1). Consequently, excluding a difference in notation, 
Eqs. (7.13) and (3.4) are equivalent and therefore as a direct application of 
Theorem 3.1 we can quote the following result (Lemma 7.2): 
CONDITION 7.2. /)n(n) and/)22(n) are invertible, i.e., 
det[/),(n)] =/=0, i ---- 1, 2. (7.15) 
LEMMA 7.2. Under Condition 7.2, if either 
;~(b2(n) D~(n) D;~(n) ~.~(n)) < 1 (7.1 6a) 
643/38/i-4 
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or  
A(/)2-1(n)/)21(n)/)~l~(n)/~z(n)) < 1, (7.16b) 
then Eqs. (7.12) admit a unique solution pair {'71 ~ ~ ~o,?¢.~,,-1~ ~ J, ..,r2 '~~ 58~" "(.7"-1) 
given by 
*7~'~(n~ ~) = A~"~*(n) + B~"[z~(n) -- H~(n) f*(n)], i = 1, 2, (7.17) 
where A, '~, 131% Bz", and ~*(n) are given by (4.17), (4.18a), (4.19), and (4.28), 
respectively. 
ProofofLemma 7.2. It follows directly from Theorem 3.1 through appropriate 
identifications. 
Now, we immediately have the counterpart of Lemma 4.2: 
LEMMA 7.3. If{'21", ~72"} is a globally optimal equilibrium solution or a stagewise 
equilibrium solution f r the multistage decision problem under consideration, and if 
Assumptions 1 and 2 given in Section 7 are valid, then the dependence of *7~(~h ~) 
on z~(n) is determined through theaffine transformation 
"7i"(~7~") = B~"z~(n) + A,"l,~(Z,_a), i = 1, 2, (7.18a) 
where l~" is an element of the Banach space c~z,_l ( .7,-2) and is defined at equilibrium 
by 
*li~(Z,_l) = ~*(n), i = 1, 2. (7.18b) 
Now, as a final step in the verification of the validity of Assumptions 1 and 2 
(or equivalently of Theorem 4.1), let us take the decision laws {'71 ~, *Tz k, k = 
N- -  1 .... , n + 1} as given in Theorem 4.1 and { 71 , *72"} as given above by 
(7.18a), and under these strategies let us evaluate the expected value of J#  with 
respect to the statistics of {v(N -- 1),..., v(n), w,(N -- 1),..., wl(n), w2(N -- 1) ..... 
we(n)}. Denoting this averaging operation by E,['], we thus seek to determine 
^ 
J-i n E r? , r  u , = -La, ,-1 , _u2") ] ul(n) = *71~('), u2(n) = "7~(')] (7.19) 
where J~-(., -) is as defined by (7.9b). To that end we first evaluate x(n + 1) and 
I"+V'~ i = 1, 2, when "71n(') and "72n(") are as given by (7.18a): i k l '  
x(n + 1) = P(n) x(n) + al(n) A?f?(-) + a2(n) &%"(')  + a~(n) B?~l(n) 
-[- G2(n) B~"w2(n) + v(n), (7.20a) 
17+~(.) = F(n) K(n) 4n) + al(n) Bl%(n) + a~(n) B2"~(n) 
+ [F(nV -- K(n) H(n)] + a~(n) A~"] l,~(.) + C~(n) A¢I~"(.) 
: P(n) x(n) + ¢.(n) l?(') + ~;(~) l?(') + ~w~(n) + ~wj(n), 
i@ j ,  i , j=  1,2, (7.20b) 
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where/~(n),/?(n),/~i~, G i(n), and G~(n) are given by (4.25a), (4.25b), (4.25e), 
Ji , and after (4.25g), and (4.25h), respectivelv. Then, we substitute (7.20) into * ~
^ 
relevant manipulations we arrive at the following quadratic expression for fi*~: 
j~  = ½~(~) Oi(~) 4~) + ~(~) d~j(~)!(,,) + ½!~(~) 0.(~)!(~) + w(~), 
i @j ,  i , j=  1,2, (7.21) 
where Ci('), ~ij('), and Cii(') are defined by (4.22), (4.23), and (4.24), respectively, 
and ~oi(') denotes the sum of all the additional terms which are independent 
of x(i), i = n,..., O, and _/('). Since goi(. ) does not affect the solution, its exact 
expression will not be needed here. 
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4.1, let us now make the following 
comparisons: 
(i) (7.4) with (7.17); 
(ii) (7.5b) with (7.18b); 
(iii) (7.6) with (7.21). 
These indicate that Assumptions 1 and 2 made at stage n @ i are equally 
valid at stage n. But since we had already verified those assumptions at stage 
N- -  1 (see Section 4), this completes the proof of Theorem 4.1 by induction. 
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